In the days leading up to Ms Mary Wambui’s ouster as chair of the Communications Authority of Kenya (CA), whispers of a looming shake-up circulated through the authority’s corridors. Few, however, anticipated that her tenure at the helm of one of the public sector’s wealthiest and most liquid agencies was about to be cut short.

Her removal was stage-managed by political power brokers to resemble a routine board reshuffle: Ms Wambui out at CA, Mr Charles Kirondo out at the Athi River Water Authority. The optics were tidy; the politics behind them, anything but that.

For seasoned observers, the move signalled waning political capital and a recalibration of alliances inside President William Ruto’s patronage network, with the 2027 election clock already ticking.

Ms Wambui, a shrewd political operator and heavyweight within the ruling United Democratic Alliance (UDA), has long been part of the inner machinery of power. Her abrupt fall from one of the most coveted chairs in government says much about the shifting sands beneath Kenya’s political elite.

Her appointment in the first place was a political deal. In well-governed countries, telecommunications regulation is treated with utmost seriousness. Board members are expected to understand economics — to make decisions on tariffs, fair competition, and spectrum allocation.

 They are also expected to have engineering or technical backgrounds to grasp spectrum management, cybersecurity risks, emerging digital technologies, and interconnection rules.

Kenya’s political elite, however, routinely sacrifice meritocracy at the altar of loyalty. In telecommunications, this practice breeds weak oversight and leaves networks vulnerable to data breaches, espionage, and service disruptions.

Yes, pork-barrel politics and “jobs for the boys” are part of our political DNA. But the bare minimum for appointments to boards like the CA should be relevant skills, competitive recruitment, and professional independence.

Telecommunications today is not just an enabler — it is a core driver of growth in financial inclusion, e-commerce, and digital health. Dumping political rejects onto the CA board undermines this critical role. Indeed, political interference is a key reason for the authority’s chronic CEO turnover.

For years, factions of the political elite have fought to control CA’s board and management. In 2023, the stakes rose sharply during the ouster of former CEO Ezra Chiloba, an exercise driven by incoming political forces. CA controls the Universal Service Fund, worth billions in cash and liquid assets.

 When the government announced plans to use this money to finance fibre-optic projects in every constituency, politically connected contractors began circling like vultures.

Many of those vying for control were UDA insiders and campaign financiers, approaching the regulator with a sense of entitlement born of political investment.

In the wake of the controversial suspension of former chief executive — Mr Francis Wangusi — it was revealed that bureaucrats at the Ministry of Information, Communications and Technology routinely collected money from CA to purchase airline tickets for ministers and principal secretaries travelling with their personal assistants to attend feel-good trips abroad.

 Then there is the issue of governance. Despite the fact that the law says that a director cannot serve for more than two three-year terms, some chairman enjoyed longer tenures.

 And, one of the reasons why the governance of the regulator is in a mess is the fact that its board is packed with too many civil servants with little knowledge and experience in modern regulation of the telecommunications sector.

In 2015, the National Treasury had to block a mega property development project that sections of the board of the authority and influential consultants were fiercely campaigning for.

 This was a grandly designed property development project whose scope had been vastly expanded to include conference facilities, an amusement centre, hotels and restaurants.

 We must de-politicise telecommunications regulation and start debating the real issues. A strong, independent regulator is what delivers affordable prices and universal access — not backroom deals.

The debate on market dominance has dragged on since the 2017 Analysis Mason report. Contracted by CA, these consultants were supposed to give us a new framework for regulating abuse of market dominance.

As it turned out, they came up come with recommendations with far-reaching implications — a long list of controls resembling the ancient regime of price controls era of the 80’s, including, administratively-determined floor prices, forced sharing of towers and at prices decided by bureaucrats sitting on arm chairs in government offices, and regulation of promotion and loyalty programmes.

The core questions remain: Do we have a competition authority independent enough to act on merit? Does our regulator possess strong enforcement powers, deep expertise, and an even-handed approach?

Until we break the cycle of patronage in regulatory appointments, these goals will remain elusive — and the public will continue paying the price.

A credible competition regime should deliver: High-quality services at affordable prices, equal access to advanced services in all counties at rates comparable to urban areas and connectivity for schools, healthcare facilities, and libraries.

Until we break the cycle of patronage in regulatory appointments, these goals will remain elusive — and the public will continue paying the price.